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Richard  Watson  attempts  to  provide  a
  
justification  for  ascribing  morall rights
  
to  humans  but  not  to  (most)t  animals
i l 
 
or  nature.. He  takes  the  conventional

 
approach  tot  rights,i t , an  approach  which
i 
 
allowsll  one  tot  att:r.i'bllte a  righti t tot  an

t _i'bllt  
36 
entity onlyl  if that entity can fulfill 
reciprocal duties.. Mostt of Watson'st '  
article is an attack on Singer's'  viewi  
of animali l rights. He argues that rights 
mustt be earned and that sentient beingsi  
who cannott be morall agents cannott be 
said to have rights. 
A moral agent is defined as any agent 
that does, or intends to, fulfill duties. 
This requires that the agent have the 
following characteristics: (1) self­1
consciousness (knowledge that something 
is happening to oneself), (2) capability 
of understanding moral principles 
about rights and duties, (3) freedom 
to act either according to or opposed 
to given principles of duty, (4) 
understanding of given principles of duty, 
(5) physical capability of acting accor­
ding to duty, and (6) intention to act 
according to or opposed to given principles 
of duty. This is referred to as a re­
ciprocity framework. 
Watson claims that the mere possession 
of sentience or life does not endow an 
entity with the right to life or to 
relief from unnecessary suffering. 
The capacity for physical or mental 
suffering is not a sufficient condition 
of having interests or rights. The 
reciporocity framework is not arbitrary 
or  self-serving  in  the  sense  that  it 
applies  to  humans only.  Many animals,  
he  concedes,  meet the  six  criteria:  
"Some chimpanzees,  gorillas  (probably  
orangutans  and perhaps  gibbons),  dolphins,. 
(probably  whales), elephants,  dogs, pigs, 
and  maybe cats  and some other  animals  
are  sometimes  moral  agents."  (128)  
nature. corporations,  
W . .
Given  this  framework  ,
 
the  State,  and  the  Church  do not  qualify 
 
as  moral  entities. Watson  addresses 
 
arguments  designed  to  justify  treating 
 
corporations  as  persons., as  responsible 
 
moral  agents.  He argues  that  the 
 
,
personification  of abstract entities 
does  rioti ... titute· an advancement in  
~_~!,a~ten ties
cons i.. - -aci  
morality  because  such  personification  
is  often  used  as  a  means  of  avoiding  
individual  responsib1ity.lit . 
Althoughlt  Watsont  does  not  wishi  to  deny  
brain  damaged  or  senile  persons  the  
righti t tot  life  or  reliefli  fromfr  paini  and  
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suffering, his framework does in fact 
rule out of the moral realm most ani­-
mals and many human beings, namely, 
those who will never have or recover 
the status of a moral agent. Although 
we have no duties with regard to such 
nonmoral agents, Watson suggests that 
we should treat them with kindness. 
This moral imperative is derived from 
the fact that we assign "secondary 
rights" to nonmoral agents and nature. 
The assignment "is made as a convenience 
to human interests and does not result 
in 'real' rights and duties." (p. 105) 
Watson never explains why self-conscious­-
ness should-be considered the determinant 
of rights. The reciprocity framework 
is a recommendation and is advanced on 
the assumption that natural rights do 
not exist. In addition to begging the 
issue of speciesism as presented by 
Singer, Watson obscures the distinction 
between merited rights and other types 
of rights that can be granted even if 
natural rights do not exist. His 
arguments do not establish that it 
makes sense to consider the right to 
life as earnedan m  right equivalent to 
the right to vote or attend a private 
meeting. 
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